














The French Presidential elections of 2002 have exacerbated the debate on the future of 
the pension system. This debate started about 20 years ago, and has been paved with 
numerous reports, books, and contributions that have not been followed by significant 
political decisions. Only one reform, the Balladur reform (after the name of the conservative 
Prime Minister in place at that time, Edouard Balladur) has been enacted in 1993. 
Surprisingly, the Balladur reform was inspired by the White Book issued in 1991 and ordered 
by Michel Rocard when he was the Prime Minister of a socialist Government. The first pillar 
of the pension system, i.e. the pay-as-you-go basic scheme was the only concern of the 
Balladur reform. The other pillars, i.e. complementary PAYG or funded schemes, were not 
affected. In March 1997, the Parliament enacted the Thomas Act (after the name of the 
conservative  deputy who wrote the proposal) that introduced retirement savings plan (Plans 
d’épargne retraite), but the law has never been enforced because of the political switch in 
June 1997 and has been formally abrogated in 2002. 
 
  Today there still lack a consensus on pension funds in France. The only issue that 
seems not to be debatable is the willingness to maintain a PAYG public scheme for the basic 
and complementary pension schemes. The debate concerns the introduction of pension funds 
as a third pillar. We show in this paper that, even if pension funds hardly exist in France, they 
have close, but imperfect, substitutes such as life insurance and employee-saving schemes. 
The difficulty is that these saving instruments are not specifically designed for retirement 
purposes. There is thus a risk of insufficient saving at old-age. We advocate the introduction 
of pension-oriented schemes, but not as designed by the Thomas Act, since there is an 
insufficient protection of wage-earners against financial risks. The first section is devoted to 
an institutional overview of the French pension system, and presents basic statistics. The 
second section gives some details on the supplementary occupational funded schemes. In 
section 3, we argue that funding does exist in France, through personal savings. In section 4 
we show that the last reforms did not pave the way to pension funds. Section 5 concludes. 
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  The French Presidential elections of 2002 have exacerbated the debate on the future of 
the pension system. This debate started about 20 years ago, and has been paved with 
numerous reports, books, and contributions that have not been followed by significant 
political decisions. Only one reform, the Balladur reform (after the name of the conservative 
Prime Minister in place at that time, Edouard Balladur) has been enacted in 1993. 
Surprisingly, the Balladur reform was inspired by the White Book issued in 1991 and ordered 
by Michel Rocard when he was the Prime Minister of a socialist Government. The first pillar 
of the pension system, i.e. the pay-as-you-go basic scheme was the only concern of the 
Balladur reform. The other pillars, i.e. complementary PAYG or funded schemes, were not 
affected. In March 1997, the Parliament enacted the Thomas Act (after the name of the 
conservative  deputy who wrote the proposal) that introduced retirement savings plan (Plans 
d’épargne retraite), but the law has never been enforced because of the political switch in 
June 1997 and has been formally abrogated in 2002. 
 
  Today there still lack a consensus on pension funds in France. The only issue that 
seems not to be debatable is the willingness to maintain a PAYG public scheme for the basic 
and complementary pension schemes. The debate concerns the introduction of pension funds 
as a third pillar. The lack of consensus, on the political scene and among French economists, 
has several explanations: 
-  there are doubts on the magnitude of the pension problem: some argue that many 
demographic and economic assumptions are too pessimistic, and that ageing of the French 
population can be coped with better economic growth; 
-  therefore, many actors of the French pension system only advocate changes in the first 
two pillars (changing contribution rates, replacement rates, or age of retirement); others 
are prone to the implementation of some funding on top of the existing PAYG pillar; 
-  even on the side of the funding proponents, there are divergences on the methods to 
introduce funding: should the Government foster personal savings (life insurance, for 
example), pensions plans, employee saving schemes, or the accumulation of reserves in 
the PAYG system? 
 
The first section is devoted to an institutional overview of the French pension system, 
and presents basic statistics. The second section gives some details on the supplementary 
occupational funded schemes. In section 3, we argue that funding does exist in France, 
through personal savings. In section 4 we show that the last reforms did not pave the way to 
pension funds.  
 
1.  The first two pillars: institutional overview and facts 
 
The French pension system has three main characteristics. First, it relies on a pay-as-
you-go basis, with a negligible accumulation of reserves (less than 6 month of benefits). 
Second it is a mosaic of peculiar schemes added up since the end of World War II. Third, it is 
rather generous compared to those of other developed countries. 
 
   21.1. The first two pillars: an institutional overview 
 
1.1.1.  Pension schemes in the private sector 
 
For workers in the private sector, representing two third of the labour force, the 
pension system relies on two pillars, the basic general scheme and the complementary 
earnings-related schemes, both compulsory and financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.  
 
  The basic general scheme (Régime général managed by the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance 
Vieilliesse des Travailleurs Salariés) 
 
The general regime was enforced after the second World War, and has been modified 
in 1982 and 1993. As of today, the contributions (workers’ and employers’) are based on the 
fraction of wages under the Social Security ceiling (which is equal to EUR 28 224 per year as 
of April 2002). To be entitled to full benefits, both men and women must be 60 years old 
(since 1983), and have to contribute during 40 years 
2. The pension is proportional to the 
number of years they have contributed, and a reference wage which is an average of the best 
25 years of career 
3: 
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rendez vous if there is an excessive increase of average wages compared to inflation), and 
d r w
α  
is a coefficient that depends on  (for   equal to 160 quarters,  d d α  amounts to 50%, and 
decreases as   decreases with a minimum equal to 25%), according to the following formula:  d
 
(2)  [] )) 160 ), 65 .( 4 ( , 0 % 25 . 1 % 50 d a Min Max − − − = α  
 
with   the age at pension liquidation. At the maximum, the replacement rate of the general 
regime is equal to 50%. 
a
 
  The complementary compulsory schemes 
 
The complementary schemes are computed on a notional basis, known as régimes en 
points. They are compulsory since 1972, and have not been affected by the 1993 reform of the 
general regime. Points are accumulated during wage-earners’ career in proportion of their 
contributions (the whole career is taken into account). The contribution rate is fixed. The 
benefits are then equal to the number of cumulated points multiplied by the value of the point 
according to the following formula: 
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2 The Balladur reform has increased the length of contribution by one quarter per year (starting from 150 
quarters) between 1994 and 2003, starting from the 1934 cohort. The 1943 cohort will be the first cohort to 
experience the new conditions in 2003. 
3  Before the Balladur reform, the reference wage was computed on the best 10 years of career.  
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  There are two different complementary schemes, one for the non-executive workers 
and the other for executives, all being co-managed by trade unions and employers. For non-
executives, the contributions are proportional to the wage up to three social security ceilings 
(i.e. the wage is truncated to EUR 84 672 per year as of April 2002), and collected by 
ARRCO (Association des Régimes de Retraites COmplémentaires, non cadres). For 
executives, the contributions under the social security ceiling are collected by ARRCO, and 
by AGIRC (Association des Institutions des Retraites des Cadres) for the fraction of wage 
between one and eight ceilings.  
 
1.1.2.  Other pension schemes 
 
  The public sector 
 
In the public sector, there are many special pension schemes for public servants, 
workers of the public transportation services, and other organisation such as Banque de 
France, Opera, Comédie française, public utilities… All these schemes have been created 
before 1945, and have preserved their autonomy. They encompass both the basic and the 
complementary regimes in a unique scheme.  
 
For the civil servants, the legal retirement age is 60. The affiliated is entitled to a full 
pension, if he (she) has contributed for 37,5 years. The benefits are equal to 75 % of the last 
six-month wage. 
 
  Self employed workers 
 
At the end of World War II, the self-employed workers refused to join the general 
regime. The 1948 Act has created four autonomous regimes for craftsmen, shopkeepers and 
manufacturers, professionals and lawyers. These schemes are compulsory, and have two 
pillars: the first pillar is the general regime of wage earners, the second one being specific to 
each profession.  
 
1.1.3.  Old-age benefits (Minimum vieillesse)  
 
Apart from occupational pension schemes, there is a minimum old-age pension 
scheme open to those who have never contributed because they did not work at all, or those 
who get a too small pension because the length of contribution period has been to short and/or 
the revenues were too weak. These persons are entitled to benefit from a non contributory 
benefit (if their pension is inferior to a limit). This is the first tier of the minimum old-age 
pension; it amounts to EUR 6 832.58 per year for a single (as of 1
st January 2002) which 
represents two third of the legal minimum wage. The second tier is a benefit from the Fonds 
de solidarité vieillesse which is given under resource conditions, and which depends on 
recipient’s matrimonial situation. In 1998, 760 300 retirees perceived the second tier benefit; 
since its creation in 1956, the number of recipients has dramatically decrease (-26% between 
1993 and 1998). 
 
   41.2. Some statistics  
 
This section presents basic statistics on the demographic and economic context of the 
pension debate in France.  
 
  Demography 
 
The total population amounts to 59 million inhabitants in 2001: 25.4 % are under 20, 
the 20-64 age group represents 58.5 %, and 16.1 % are over 65 (see table 1). Life expectancy 
at birth is 75.5 years for men, and 83.0 years for women. At 60, life expectancy is 20.2 and 
25.3 years respectively (see table 2). The Conseil d’Orientation des retraites (2002) has 
computed a “retirement expectancy” which is the product of the life expectancy at 60 by the 
probability of reaching 60. Calculated on the labour force aged 20 to 59, the “retirement 
expectancy” is 18.2 years for men, and 24.5 years for women (see table 3). These last figures 
are crucial for the financial sustainability of pension schemes. 
 
  Labour force represents 24 million workers (see table 4). Women’s share is 46.3 %, 
and the contribution of the age group “55 and over” to labour force is 13.4. The employment 
rate of the 55-64 age group is equal to 37.2 %, which is fairly low compared to other 
European countries (see table 5). It is expected by the Conseil d’Orientation des retraites to 
increase to 44.3 % in 2010 (with the suppression of pre-retirement schemes, and the 
progressive increase in retirement age). 
 
  There are about 9.7 million pensioners in the general regime. Women represent 55.4 % 
of the total number of pensioners. The average pensioner’s age is 73.3, slightly above for 
women (see table 6). When all regimes are taken into account, the number of pensioners 
culminates at 19.4 million. Wage-earners represent 79.8 % of the total, self-employed 20.2% 
(see table 8).  
 
  Contribution rates 
 
In the general regime, the contribution rate amounts to 6.55 % of the wage under the 
social security ceiling for employees.  For employers, there are two contribution rates: 8.2 % 
of the wage under the social security ceiling plus 1.6 % of total wage for employers. The total 
contribution rate is thus roughly equal to 16%. It has not changed since 1991 (see table 9). In 
other regimes, contribution rates may differ (see table 10: they are the same for independent 
workers (craftsmen), slightly higher for shopkeepers, much higher in the railways publicly-
owned monopoly (36.29%). 
 
  Dependency ratios  
 
In 1960, the dependency ratio in the general regime was equal to 4.14, and is now 
equal to 1.59 (table 12). In some other regimes, the situation is worse: the ratio is equal to 0.7 
in the railways monopoly for example (see table 12). On the other hand, the situation is better 
in the second pillar PAYG complementary schemes: the dependency ratios are 1.7 for 
ARRCO and 2.4 for AGIRC (see table 13). Table 14 et 15 give a detailed description of 
ARRCO and AGIRC regimes. 
 
   5  Pensions  
 
Table 16 exhibits the replacement rates (pension benefits of the first two pillars over 
the last wage) for the 1930 cohort: replacement rates range from 100% for minimum monthly 
net wage to 59 % for a wage above EUR 3 048 in the private sector. This shows that the 
PAYG pension scheme is fairly redistributive. The average replacement rate is 84 % in the 
private sector, and 77 % in the public sector (the variance being lower in the latter case). 
 
  Aggregate statistics 
 
  In France, public retirement spending represents 12.1% of GDP in 2000, and is 
expected to culminate at 16.0% in 2030 according to the Current policy scenario of the Ecofin 
Economic Policy Committee. Total spending for retirement in 2000 represent EUR 168,78 
billion. 
 
  Even if there are debates on the consequences of these demographic trends on pension 
system, there is now a widely shared opinion that the sustainability of the PAYG pension 
system is not guaranteed if the contribution rates, the replacement rates and the retirement age 
are held constant.  
 
 
2.  The third pillar: supplementary occupational funded schemes  
 
As will be shown in section 4, pension funds hardly exist in France. Nevertheless, 
there exist optional funded schemes, known as supplementary regimes (régimes 
supplémentaires, or régimes sur-complémentaires). This section gives a brief description of 
these supplementary optional schemes. 
 
2.1. The weakness of supplementary optional schemes 
 
The public pension schemes being rather generous, contributions collected and 
pensions served by the funded supplementary schemes represent a negligible amount 
compared to those of the public pension scheme, and compared to personal savings through 
life insurance contracts and close substitutes (see section 3). Unfortunately, there are not 
comprehensive statistics on supplementary schemes, each being managed on a firm or inter-
firm basis. On a rough estimation, total contributions amount to EUR 5.6 billion, 25 % being 
managed by supplementary pension institutions (institutions de retraite supplémentaire, IRS) 
created by firms or self-employed professional groups, and 75 % being collected by insurance 
companies through group contracts (not including in-firm pension schemes which are 
negligible). Survey data by INSEE in 1998 showed that only 9,4% of households had 
contributed to a supplementary pension scheme. According to survey data by INSEE in 2000, 
12 % of French household have voluntary retirement savings through complementary 
collective pension schemes. The possession mainly concerns self-employed 
4, and individuals 
aged 40 to 49 (with an holding rate of 21.6 %). 
                                                           
4 The Madelin Act of 1994 has fostered self-employed pension schemes. 
   62.2. The different legal schemes 
 
The supplementary funded schemes are characterised by an extreme heterogeneity and 
a complexity due to the piling up different legal provisions enacted through time.  
 
  Management devices 
 
The management of supplementary pension schemes is strictly regulated. The 
institutions entitled to manage pension contributions and benefits are insurance companies, 
mutual institutions (sociétés d’assurance mutuelles), and provident institutions (institutions de 
prévoyance). An employer may choose between three legal devices if he wants to set up a 
supplementary pension scheme. 
 
The first solution consists of a direct payment of pensions by the employer. This 
solution is legal but never used: first it is generally refused by trade unions on prudential 
grounds, and second there are no fiscal incentives for the employer to do so. 
 
The second solution is to subscribe to a group contract with an insurance company, a 
mutual institution or a social security institution. Two options are available: defined-
contribution schemes (named “article 82” and “article 83” after the number of the tax code); 
defined-benefit (named “article 39”). The “article 83” pension schemes are the most popular. 
This solution has been adopted by the French insurance sector, with the creation of the first 
sector-related pension fund in 1995.  
 
The last solution is to create a specific supplementary pension institution (IRS), which 
has to be approved by the regulatory authority. This solution is widespread among large firms 
or institutions, with 100 to 150 existing IRS. Since 1994, these specific supplementary 
pension institutions have to be fully funded, and it is impossible to create new IRS.  
 
  Typology of supplementary pension schemes 
 
Supplementary pension schemes may be distinguished on three criteria. 
 
-  The nature of pension rights: defined-benefit vs. defined contribution schemes 
 
In the defined-contributions schemes, the employer undertakes to contribute on a 
contractual basis for each affiliated, the contribution being a fixed proportion of   
salary. The affiliated gets the right to perceive the full benefits (capital and returns on 
cumulated assets). In the defined-benefit schemes, the employer undertakes to pay the 
affiliated a benefit related to career earnings, subject to years of service. The 
contributions are solely borne by the employer, and are computed on an actuarial basis 
by the managing institution. 
 
-   Additive schemes and “top-hat” schemes 
 
Defined-contribution schemes are additive: they complete the first two pillars (general 
and complementary pay-as-you-go schemes). Defined-benefit schemes may be either 
additive (they pay a pension defined as a percentage of the last (end of career) salary 
whatever the first and second pillar benefits may be), or “top-hat”. In the latter case, 
the “top-hat” pension is differential, and amounts to the difference between the 
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pillars. 
 
-  Vesting rules and portability 
 
In random rights schemes (régimes à droits aléatoires), seniority conditions are 
required to get supplementary benefits. It is generally the case in defined-benefit 
schemes: wage earners usually get nothing if they quit the firm before the legal 
retirement age. In certain rights schemes (régimes à droits certains), the benefits are 
portable: this is the case in defined-contribution schemes in which the affiliated has an 
intangible right on the contribution whatever his situation at retirement. 
 
  Examples: the PREFON and self-employed pension funds 
 
PREFON is an optional defined-benefit pension fund created in 1967 for the French 
civil servants. The idea was to complete the pay-as-you-go benefits with fully funded benefits, 
because pay-as-you-go benefits are proportional to the net wage, that is wage minus 
premiums 
5. Only wage earners contribute, and portability in another fund is ruled out. The 
affiliated may choose between 11 classes of contributions: each contribution gives a number 
of points which decrease with the age of the contributor (see table 20). The contributions may 
be reduced, increased, stopped at any time. If the civil servant has not been employed by the 
State during his whole career, he can “buy back” the corresponding contributions (up to his 16 
birthday). All contributions (normal, exceptional and “bought back”) can be deduced from the 
taxable income without ceilings. Benefits are paid as annuities exclusively, and there is a 
vesting period up to the age of 55. Pension may be liquidated from the age of 55 until 70 
(normal liquidation occurs at 60, the legal retirement age). 
 
The performance of PREFON is fairly robust, compared to close substitutes such as 
life insurance (about  6 to 8 % at the age of 60, over the ten past years). The assets are 
managed by a consortium of private insurance companies, nearly 80 % of assets being 
invested in bonds, 10 % in shares and the rest in properties, mutual funds and other assets. 
Despite the performance, PREFON has a poor success since only 4 % of the concerned 
population is affiliated (230 000 affiliated, including 60 000 pensioners) 
6. 
 
Since the Madelin Act enacted in 1994, self-employed workers may contribute to 
optional supplementary schemes with fiscal exemptions. The contributions to the scheme can 
be deduced from the taxable income, with a ceiling equal to 19% of 8 social security ceilings  
(that is EUR 42 900). The Madelin Act concerns about 2 million self-employed and spouse, 
but its success is timid. 
 
Table 17 and table 18 exhibit some statistics about these supplementary voluntary 
pension schemes. 
 
  Are there incentive for an employer to create a supplementary pension scheme? 
 
There is a strong fiscal incentive to create a supplementary pension scheme, since 
pension contribution are tax-exempted under different ceilings, depending on the nature of the 
                                                           
5 Average premium is equal to 15 % of the salary, and premiums may reach 50 % of the salary. 
6 Two other schemes are available to civil servants (CEGOS for medical workers, and CREF), and suffer from 
the same disaffection. 
   8tax (income tax or social security contribution). For example, if the employer’s contribution 
amounts to 10% of the annual salary, there is full tax exemption for all annual salaries inferior 
to EUR 90 000. This is fairly generous for low incomes, but the incentive is nil for top 
executives.  
 
  On the opposite side, the incentive for the employee to join the employers’ pension 
scheme (when it is optional) is not obvious. Annuities are not tax-exempted, and are heavily 
taxed compared to other savings instruments (see the following section). 
 
3.  Funding in France: the importance of personal savings 
 
The French households’ saving rate amounts to 16,4 % (as of march 2002). For the 
last 20 years, there has been a tremendous increase of personal financial savings through life 
insurance. Failing pension funds, French households have accumulated long term savings on a 
personal basis. After a brief description of households’ current saving behaviour, this section 
will argue that individual saving is riskier than collective accumulation through pension 
funds, making individual saving a second best compared to pension funds. 
 
3.1. Life insurance in French households’ wealth 
 
France has been experiencing a very high saving rate, above 15% of gross disposable 
income since the beginning of the 90s. Since the non-financial saving rate is stable, the 
relatively high, and still increasing, saving rate may be explained by the level of the financial 
saving rate, which may be in turn explained by a precautionary behaviour. Indeed, even if the 
unemployment rate has been reduced, the fear of unemployment is strong. Moreover, French 
households are worried by the long term soundness of the pay-as-you-go pension system, and 
accumulate precautionary savings accordingly.  
 
Before the financial liberalisation, French households favoured liquid savings (current 
accounts, savings accounts…). For the last 20 years, there has been a tremendous infatuation 
for life insurance contracts. In 1980, the outstanding of policy insurance reserves represented 
EUR 14,8 billion, that is a share in households’ financial wealth (unlisted securities excluded) 
equal to 4.3%. In 2000, the figures were EUR 650 billion and 33%, respectively. Since 1996, 
about 70% of saving flows are invested each year in insurance products. In 2000, the 
households’ net saving flows amounted to EUR 100 billion, with 77% in life insurance. This 
evolution has several explanations: subscription of news contracts, increased payments on 
existing contracts, latent appreciation of assets, supply-side effects banks starting to sell life 
insurance in their networks, and the very attractive fiscal treatment of life insurance (Lavigne 
and Pardo, 2000). 
 
  What are the expectations for the next 10 years? According to Boutillier et al. (2001), 
the outstanding of policy insurance reserves will amount to EUR 1 400 billion in 2010, with 
an annual flow of EUR 75 billion each year (see table 19). These estimations are based on the 
following economic assumptions: a 2.7% annual growth rate, a 8.3% unemployment rate, a 
15% saving rate, a 10% annual rate of return on capital and a logistic curve for the diffusion 
of insurance contracts. Of course, these assumptions are crucial, especially the assumption of 
a non-decreasing return on capital. We might indeed expect a sharp decrease of this rate, as 
the numerous baby-boom generation retires and sells its assets to finance its retirement needs.  
 
   9  To assess whether ageing increases or decreases the propensity to save, further 
investigations have been made (El Mekkaoui et al., 2001, 2002). El Mekkaoui et al. (2002) 
show that households do not reduce their holdings in life insurance when they get older (up to  
85 years old). This does not mean that older households are risk averse. In a companion paper, 
El Mekkaoui et al. (2001) showed that households have an increasing probability to hold 
securities as they get older. Our contention is that life insurance has multiple motives, 
including retirement, bequest, and covers precautionary needs at old age (long-term care). On 
the opposite, older households may take more financial risks, since their exposure to income 
risk is reduced. The relative weight of human capital is reduced when people get older: at the 
end of career the present value of uncertain labour income is low.  
 
3.2. Pension funds vs. personal savings 
 
Is there really a need for pension funds in France, since French households seem to 
have put up with personal life insurance to overcome the expected difficulties of the French 
pay-as-you-go pension system? 
 
In the preceding paragraph, it was argued that there is a rationale for older individuals 
to hold risky assets, and to increase the share of risky asset in financial wealth as they become 
older. This behaviour may seem irrational since the life horizon is reduced when getting old. 
Indeed, a widespread advice given by newspapers is to invest in long-term assets when young, 
to turn to shorter-term assets when getting close to retirement. The underlying assumption is  
that if stocks outperform bonds in the long run, long-horizon investors may increase their 
financial risk exposure because they have more time to recoup transient losses. But, as 
Samuelson  (1969) rightly argued, this conventional wisdom is a fallacious interpretation of 
the Law of Large Numbers: adding risks over a long period of time does not cause risk to 
wash out. In other words, time diversification operates through dividing and not adding risks. 
This is formally shown in intertemporel models of portfolio selection: the optimal share of 
risky asset does not depend on age (and thus on residual life horizon) if agents have a constant 
relative risk aversion (i.e. when relative risk aversion is independent of wealth). In this case, if 
the return of the risky asset follows a random walk, re-optimisation period by period leads to 
the same portfolio allocation as a long-term planning. 
 
Of course, this independence of life horizon and portfolio selection  does not hold 
under other assumptions, such as convex risk aversion, liquidity constraints and the existence 
of background risks (i.e. risks that cannot be insured, or traded on markets, divorce for 
example). In some cases, it may be optimal for an individual to increase risk taking when he 
gets older; on the opposite, a young individual facing large background risks has no incentive 
to financial risk exposure, and then forsake long-term rewarding opportunities on the financial 
markets. 
 
Is this conclusion transposable to pension fund management? Empirically, in the 
United-Kingdom, the United States, Ireland and Australia, the share of risky assets is larger in 
pension funds portfolios than in households’ wealth (Lavigne, 1998). On the opposite, 
investment in stocks is much more modes for pension funds and life insurance companies in 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
 
On a theoretical ground, there are several arguments for a risky behaviour of pension 
funds 
7. First of all, time diversification is feasible for pension funds. An isolated individual is 
                                                           
7 At least, a riskier behaviour compared to individuals’ portfolio management. 
   10exposed to liquidity constraints when he retires: he may incur a capital loss if he has to 
liquidate his assets to finance his consumption needs when there is a turndown on financial 
markets. As far as a pension fund has overlapping cohorts of pensioners, it may postpone (at 
least partially) its sales of assets until better times. In the second place, the maturity of the 
fund is crucial for investment in risky assets. Mature funds tend to overweight bonds in their 
liabilities, while immature funds invest a higher share in stocks. This difference explains why 
in all OECD countries the share of stocks in pension funds portfolio increased on the 1970-
1990 period, except in the USA where it remained stable around 45% (Davis, 1992). The third 
argument deals with scale economies: an isolated individual is subject to a wealth constraint 
which is not the case for a pension fund. Pension funds may then diversify both financial risks 
(horizontal diversification) and time horizons (vertical diversification). For the same sake of 
argument, collective investment through pension funds reduce information costs and 
transaction costs. 
 
Can we conclude that pension funds are, or should be, risk neutral? In an ideal perfect 
world, pension funds would be risk neutral 
8. In the real world, this property does not hold. 
First, pension funds management entails agency conflicts (El Mekkaoui and Lavigne, 2000). 
Investment decisions then depend on the relative bargaining power of the different 
stakeholders, especially for defined-benefit funds. In the USA, when the employees’ 
representatives have the control of the fund, the invested share in risky assets is lower, the 
closer to retirement the representatives are. More generally, when the fund is managed with a 
parity between employers’ and employees’ representatives in the board of trustees as it is 
usually the case in continental Europe, risk aversion is higher, compared to situations where is 
an external management of the fund (as in the USA for example). The difference between 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension funds gives another argument for risk 
aversion or risk taking. Because in defined-contribution plans the risk is borne by the 
employee, pension funds managers display a more prudent strategy. 
 
In this section, we have shown that pension funds may reduce the return volatility of 
retirement benefits, compared to individual saving, through a better diversification. Of course, 
in order for this reduction of risk to be effective, there must be a sound prudential regulation, 
concerning funding, diversification, sanctions of frauds… Moreover, on equity grounds, there 
is another argument for collective funding vs. individual saving: the life insurance boom has 
been supported by tax exemptions and tax reductions that favoured the wealthiest households.  
 
 
4.  Pension funds: still to come? 
 
The French history has been plagued by the collapse of funded pension schemes in the 
1930s due to economic recession and runaway inflation. Many French families still keep in  
mind this grievous episode, even if the persons who experienced it are less and less numerous. 
This may explain the reluctance of successive governments to implement pension funds in 
France (see in appendix 3, the quite impressive list of books, official reports, contributions on 
the reform of pension schemes since 1991). 
 
In January 2002, the socialist Government has formally abrogated the Thomas Act of 
1997 that designed a regulatory and fiscal frame for pension funds in France. This abrogation 
ends a series of reforms that were perceived by the socialist Government as close substitutes 
to the implementation of pension funds. The main two reforms were the creation of a reserve 
                                                           
8 They would even not exist in a frictionless world. 
   11fund (Fonds de réserve des retraites) that enables funding within the PAYG pension scheme, 
and the design of new employee saving schemes. 
 
4.1. Accumulating reserves within the pay-as-you-go public pension system 
 
The Fonds de réserve des retraites has been created in 1999 in order to smooth the 
expected deficit of the first two pillars of public pension schemes during the 2005-2015 
decade. This solution was promoted by Martine Aubry, Minister of social affairs at that time 
(Davanne 
9 and Pujol, 1997). The main resources of the reserve fund are expected to be 
incomes from privatisation, exceptional fiscal receipts, and incomes from UMTS spectrum 
auctions. The social partners are still dubious about the ability of the reserve fund to achieve 
its smoothing goal. On the employers’ side (independent workers, small and large businesses), 
the reserve fund is expected to foster new increases in contribution rates, with correlative 
wage distortions and declining competitiveness. Employers also fear that the reserves will be 
invested in government bonds, instead of equities. On the trade-union side, the reserve fund is 
perceived as a disguised introduction of pension funds. Since many trade-unions are hostile to 
funding whatever its modus operandi, the reserve fund faces the opposition of left-wing trade-
unions; only the reformist CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail) and the 
CFTC (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens, a moderate but marginal trade-
union) are not opposed to the reserve fund, and to partial funded pension schemes. 
  
4.2. Developing employee saving schemes 
 
As stressed by Blanchet and Legros (2000), “[…] there is a feeling that pension funds 
are less in favour. There are increasing doubts about the necessity to add a new instrument for 
retirement. This is partly the result of a relative demobilisation of professional lobbies which 
preferred going back to their traditional fields, especially life insurance […]”. 
 
The political strategy of the socialist government to bypass the trade-unions’ 
opposition to pension funds has been to foster employee-saving schemes. The government 
expected that trade-unions would be sensitive to the argument that foreign ownership of 
French firms is a threat to French wage-earners. Indeed, about 40% of equities issued by 
French quoted firms are held by foreign investors. The development of employee-saving 
schemes is a means to obviate both the under-capitalisation of French firms, and their low 
ratio of domestic over non-resident ownership. 
 
In 1999, about 5.4 million wage-earners, that is 37% of the labour force in non-
agricultural firms, have benefited from an employee-rewarding scheme. Until recently, there 
were two different employee-saving schemes: 
-  Participation: it is a compulsory mechanism for firms with more than 50 employees; it 
enables wage-owners to benefit from a share of the annual profits (if any). The global 




C B RSP ). . 05 , 0 .( 5 , 0 − =  
where B  denotes the annual profit, C  the capital,   the salaries, and VA the value added 
by the firm. The accrued rights to participation are vested during 5 years, except in a few 
legal cases (marriage, acquisition of main residence, dismissal…). The RSP may be 
S
                                                           
9 Olivier Davanne was Martine Aubry’s counsellor ; he is now a member of the Conseil d’orientation des 
retraites. 
   12invested in different instruments: deposits on a frozen bank account; own equities of the 
firm; equities and shares in mutual funds; shares of FCPE (Fonds Commun de Placement 
d’Entreprise), a mutual fund dedicated to wage-earners; contributions to a  PEE (Plan 
d’épargne d’entreprise).  
 
-  Intéressement: it is an optional mechanism for all firms; it enables a firm to share, for a 
three-year period, some performances or objectives (such as profits, or increasing 
productivity, or quality bonuses…) with the wage-earners. It is necessarily collective and 
must have a random component. The amount of intéressement may be paid immediately, 
or saved on a PEE (Plan d’épargne d’entreprise). In the latter case, the sum is tax-
exempted if it saved over five years or more. The amount of intéressement cannot exceed 
20% of the total wage bill, and cannot exceed the social security ceiling for each 
employee.  
 
The Plan d’épargne d’entreprise is a saving instrument created to back participation 
and intéressement. It enables the wage-earners to build up a collective portfolio of securities. 
The sums invested may come from participation and intéressement, from voluntary saving 
(up to 25% of annual wage), or complementary discretionary payments of the employer. 
 
In 1998, firms distributed about EUR 6.9 billions, equally shared between 
participation and intéressement. Annual average payment to wage-earners amount to 
EUR 945, with great disparities among sectors and firms (smaller firms are more generous). 
 
In February 2001, a new law (Loi du 7 février 2001 sur l’épargne salariale) has 
introduced two new saving instruments: the Plan d’épargne interentreprise (PEI) and the 
Plan Partenarial d’Epargne Salariale Volontaire (PPESV). The PEI is designed to give 
incentives to small and medium firms to offer employee-saving schemes (only 3.5 % of firms 
were offering a PEE in 1998 – 46% of firms with 500 employees and over). With the PEI, 
several firms may implement a common employee-saving plan, on a sectoral or geographical 
basis. The PPESV is created to give a longer saving horizon than the PEE, 10 years instead of 
5. This reform aims at introducing a retirement-like horizon to collective saving. 
 
Even if employee-saving schemes are not exclusively pension-oriented schemes there 
are perceived as close substitutes for the moderate trade-unions and the socialist government 
that introduced the PEI  and the PPSV. For left-wing trade-unions, the development of 
employee-saving schemes is no more than a Trojan Horse in the pension system reform.  
 
4.3. Introducing pension funds: the Thomas Act revival? 
 
In 1997, the French parliament adopted a law on pension funds (the Thomas Act). The 
details of this now abrogated law are  given in appendix. The main characteristics were: 
-  an optional system; 
-  defined-contribution plans; 
-  exemption of social contributions (both employers and employees) and taxes; 
-  exit in annuities. 
 
If the newly elected parliament is conservative, there may be a second life for the 
Thomas Act 
10. The main task for the government will be to create a consistent framework for 
long-term saving, namely consistent fiscal devices so that the new pension funds do not 
                                                           
10 This text has been revised on the 10
th of June 2002 before the results of French elections. 
   13merely siphon other employee-saving or personal saving schemes. The specificity of saving 
for retirement has to be recognised: what is really needed in France is a risk-free long-term 
saving scheme. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
We have shown in this paper that, even if pension funds hardly exist in France, they 
have close, but imperfect, substitutes such as life insurance and employee-saving schemes. 
The difficulty is that these saving instruments are not specifically designed for retirement 
purposes. There is thus a risk of insufficient saving at old-age. We advocate the introduction 
of pension-oriented schemes, but not as designed by the Thomas Act, since there is an 
insufficient protection of wage-earners against financial risks (in Thomas Act, pension plans 
are defined-contribution plans). 
 
 
   14Bibliography 
 
Blanchet, D. and F. Legros (2000), “France: the Difficult Path to Consensual Reforms”, paper 
prepared for the conference “Coping with the Pension Crisis: where does Europe Stand”, 
NBER/Kiel Institute for International Economics, Berlin, 20-21 March. 
 
Boubel, A. and F. Pansard (2002), “Institutionnalisation de l’épargne et placements sur les 
marchés: perspectives à l’horizon 2006 pour la zone Euro”, Eaprgne et financement, CDC, 
n°10. 
 
Boutillier, M., F. Pansard and B.  Séjourné (2001), “La montée en puissance de l’assurance-
vie en France: analyse et implications pour le système financier”, CDC Working paper, 
n°2001-17/FI. 
 
Davanne, O. and  T. Pujol (1997), “1. Analyse économique de la retraite par répartition. 2. Le 
débat sur les retraites: capitalisation contre répartition”, Revue française d’économie, Winter. 
 
Davis, E.P. (1992), Pension Funds, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 
El Mekkaoui, N. and A. Lavigne (2000), “Conflits d'agence au sein des fonds de pension 
privés”, Revue économique, 51, 187-205. 
 
El Mekkaoui, N., A. Lavigne and R. Mahieu (2001), “La détention d’actifs risqués selon 
l’âge: une étude économétrique”, Revue d’économie politique, n° spécial Epargne et retraite. 
 
El Mekkaoui, N., A. Lavigne and R. Mahieu (2002), “La détention d’assurance vie selon 
l’âge: une étude économétrique”, contribution to the 19
th international symposium on 
monetary and banking economics, Lyon, June 6-7. 
 
Gaudemet, J.-P. (2001), “Les dispositifs d’acquisition à titre facultatif d’annuités viagères en 
vue de la retraite: une diffusion limitée”, Economie et statistique, 348, 81-106. 
 
Conseil d’Analyse Economique (1998), Retraites et épargne, La documentation française, 
Paris. 
 
Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites (2002), Retraites: renouveler le contrat entre les 
générations, La Documentation Française, Paris. 
 
Dupont, G. and H. Sterdyniak (2000), Quel avenir pour nos retraites?, Repères, La 
découverte. 
 
Inséé Première (2002a), “Bilan démographique 2001”, n° 825, February, Inséé. 
 
Inséé Première (2002b), “Projections de population active: un retournement progressif”, 
n° 838, March, Inséé. 
 
Jallet, F. and P. Franceschi (2001), “Partage des profits et épargne salariale en 1999”,   
Premières synthèses, March, DARES, Minefi. 
 
Lavigne, A. (1998), “Retraites et risques financiers”, working paper, LEO, n° 1998-27. 
   15 
Lavigne, A. and C. Pardo (2000), “Les Plans d’Epargne Retraite doivent-ils être imposés 
comme les contrats d’assurance vie?”, in Bismut et De Freitas eds., Fonds de pension: aspects 
économiques et financiers, Economica, Paris. 
 
Observatoire des retraites (2002), La retraite en France, mars, n°3. 
 
Samuelson, P.A. (1969), “Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic Stochastic Programming”, 






   16Appendix 1 : Statistics 
 
 
Table 1: The age structure of French population 






65 and over 
(%) 
1985  55  157.3  29.2 58.0 12.8 
1990  56  577.0  27.8 58.3 13.9 
1995  57  752.5  26.1 58.9 15.0 
1998  58  299.0  25.8 58.5 15.7 
1999  58  496.6  25.7 58.4 15.9 
2000  58  748.7  25.6 58.4 16.0 
2001(*)  59  037.2  25.4 58.5 16.1 
Source : Inséé Première (2002) ; * : estimations. 
 
Table 2: Life expectancy at various ages 
Men Women  Year 
0  1 20  40  60 0  1 20  40  60 
1985 71.2 70.0 52.5 34.0 17.9 79.4 79.0 60.4 41.1 23.0 
1990 72.7 70.9 53.9 35.5 19.0 81.0 80.5 61.8 42.5 24.2 
1995 73.9 72.4 54.7 36.3 19.7 81.9 81.3 62.6 43.3 24.9 
1998 74.8 74.2 55.5 36.8 20.0 82.4 81.8 63.0 43.6 25.3 
1999 75.0 74.4 55.7 37.0 20.2 82.5 81.8 63.1 43.7 25.3 
2000  75.2  na na na na  82.7  na na na na 
2001(*)  75.5  na na na na  83.0  na na na na 
Source : Inséé Première (2002a) ; * : estimations ; na : not available 
 
Table 3: Life expectancy and retirement expectancy 
Men Women 
 Working  population 
(20-59 years) 

























1950  15.4 82  % 12.6 18.4 89  % 16.4 
1960  15.7 84  % 13.2 19.5 92  % 17.9 
1970  16.2 85  % 13.9 20.8 93  % 19.4 
1980  17.3 86  % 14.9 22.4 94  % 21.1 
1990  19.0 88  % 16.8 24.2 95  % 23.0 
2000  20.2 90  % 18.2 25.6 96  % 24.5 
Source : Conseil d’orientation des retraites (2002) 
 
Table 4: Labour force: structure of working population 
















60 and over 
1991 24  994  43.5  11.5  78.9 9.6 2.3 
2001 26  426  45.5 8.8 82.3 8.9  2.2 
2006 26  895  46.0 8.4 79.9  11.7 2.1 
2011 26  751  46.4 8.3 79.5  12.2 1.8 
2020 26  141  46.5 8.2 78.6  13.1 1.5 
2050 24  095  46.3 8.1 78.5  13.4 1.1 
Source : Inséé Première (2002b) ; * : estimations. 
 
   17Table 5: Labour force: current and projected employment rate 






2000 2010* 2000  2010  2000-2010 
15-24  29.5  38.0 2  290 2  980  690 
25-54  86.2  87.8 22  000 21  700  -300 
55-64  37.2  44.3 2  050 3  540 1  490 
15-64  67.9  69.6 26  340 28  220  1  880 
65  and  over  1.3  1.0 130 110 -20 
Total   26  470 28  330  1  860 
Source: Conseil d’Orientation des retraites (2002); *: projections. 
 
 
Table 6: Pensioners of the general regime in 2000 (first pillar, wage-earners of the private 
sector) 
Age group  Men  Women  Total 
55-59  3 254   90 376  96 630 
60-64  952 175  771 613  1 723 788 
65-69  1 175 835  1 231 701  2 407 536 
70-74  977 658  1 142 771  2 120 429 
75-79  697 321  988 375  4 685 696 
80-84  311 092   535 927  847 019 
85-89  176 523  414 513  591 036 
90 and over  67 262  236 808  304 070 
Total  4 361 120  5 412 114  9 773 234 
Average age  70.82  73.09  72.08 
Source : http://cnav.fr 
 
 
Table 7: Pensioners of the general regime in 2000, in proportion of total population of the 
same age group (in %) 
Age group  Men  Women  Total 
55 and over  66.60  64.03  65.15 
60 and over  84.66  75.68  79.47 
65 and over  88.12  80.48  83.59 
75 and over  80.32  77.37  78.42 
85 and over  72.60  73.60  73.32 
Source : http://cnav.fr 
 
 
Table 8: Pensioners of all regimes in 2000 
Regimes Number  Share  (%) 
Wage-earners    
- general regime  9 700 735  49.9 
- farmers  2 268 453  11.7 
- civil servants  1 714 806  8.2 
- others (mine, railways, public sector…)  1 831 505  10.0 
- total wage-earners  15 515 499  79.8 
Self-employed    
- farmers  2 054 460  10.6 
- salesmen  927 424  4.8 
- craftsmen  712 584   3.7 
- others (physician, lawyers…)  235 786  1.1 
- total self-employed  3 930 254  20.2 
Total 19  445  753  100.0 
Source : http://cnav.fr ; note: the same person may receive benefits from various regimes. 
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Table 9: Contribution rates in the general regime (employees and employers) 

















1  Jan  1982  4.70  8.2  0.0 12.90 0.0 
1  Jan  1984  5.70  8.2  0.0 13.90 0.0 
1 Aug 1986  6.40  8.2  0.0  14.60  0.0 
1  Jan  1989  7.60  8.2  0.0 15.80 0.0 
1  Feb  1991  6.55  8.2  1.6 14.75 1.6 
Source : http://cnav.fr 
 
Table 10: Contribution rates in various regimes in 2001 (employees and employers) 

















General  regime  6.55  8.2  1.6 14.75 1.6 
Craftsmen 16.35  (under  the  social security ceiling) 
Salesmen  16.35 + reversion contribution equal to 2.5% of the annual income whatever the 
matrimonial situation under 1/3 of the social security ceiling and to 3.95 over and 
up to the social security ceiling 
Civil servants  7.85  General budget   
Railways  (SNCF)  7.85  28.44 - 36.29  
Source : Observatoire des retraites (2002) 
 
Table 11: General regime: dependency ratio  
(number of contributors/number of pensioners) 
Year Contributors  Pensioners  Contributors/pensioners 
1960  9 700 000  2 344 492  4.14 
1970  12 610 000  3 321 504  3.80 
1980  13 353 800  4 988 827  2.68 
1985  12 944 159  5 860 530  2.21 
1990  13 724 032  7 315 716  1.88 
1995  14 052 655  8 750 331  1.61 
2000  15 413 792  9 700 735  1.59 
Source : http://cnav.fr 
 
Table 12: Various regimes (first pillar): dependency ratio in 2000  
(number of contributors/number of pensioners) 
Regime Contributors  Pensioners  Contributors/pensioners 
General regime  15 413 792  9 700 735  1.6 
Civil servants  2 500 000  1 600 000  1.6 
Railways (SNCF)  178 000  263 000  0.7 
Craftsmen  494 000   600 000  0.8 
Salesmen  643 400  933 078  0.7 
Source : Observatoire des retraites (2002) 
 
Table 13: Complementary regimes (second pillar): dependency ratio in 2000  
(number of contributors/number of pensioners) 
Regime Contributors  Pensioners  Contributors/pensioners 
ARRCO (non-executives)  15 000 000  8 700 000  1.7 
AGIRC (executives)  3 200 000  1 310 000  2.4 
Source : Observatoire des retraites (2002) 
   19Table 14: ARRCO regime in 2000 (non-executives)  
Number of pensioners  9 535 000 
Number of contributors  18 700 000 
Number of affiliated firms  5 700 000 
Contributions 27,0  (EUR  bn) 
Pension benefits  26.5 (EUR bn) 
Value of the point (as of 1
st April 2002)  1.0530 
Reference wage as of 2002  11.8949 
Source : http://agirc.fr  
 
Table 15: AGIRC regime in 2000 (executives)  
Number of pensioners  1 800 000 
Number of contributors  3 300 000 
Number of affiliated firms  530 000 
Contributions 11.5  (EUR  bn) 
Pension benefits  11.6 (EUR bn) 
Value of the point (as of 1
st April 2002)  0.3737 
Reference wage as of 2002  4.1494 
Source : http://agirc.fr  
 
Table 16: Replacement rates for the 1930 cohort (pension benefits over last wage) 





(general and complementary 
regimes, %) 
Less than 1 143  -  100 
1 143 ≤ w < 1 524  - 91 
1 524 ≤ w < 1 905  80 84 
1 905 ≤ w < 2 286  77 76 
2 286 ≤ w < 3 048  79 72 
More than 3 048  69  59 
Average 77  84 
Source: Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites (2002) 
 
Table 17: Contributions to supplementary funded pensions schemes in 2000 
Pension scheme  Contributions (EUR Million)  Share (%) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 1997 1998 1999 2000
‘Top-hat’ contracts (article 82)  107 183 183 110 4,3 6,0  4,5  2,0
Defined-contribution schemes 
(article 83) 
899 1 006 1 128 2 810 36,4 33,0  27,8  50,1
Defined-benefits schemes  
(article 39) 
869 838 1 631 1 300 35,2 27,5  40,2  23,2
IRS (article 411-1)  259 396 442 500 10,5 13,0  10,9  8,9
Self-employed  (Loi  Madelin)  335 442 534 700 13,6 14,5 13,2 12,5
Farmers’ pension scheme  183 137 200 0,0 6,0  3,4  3,6
Total  2 470 3 049 4 055 5 610 100,0 100,0  100,0  100,0
Source: Observatoire des retraites (2002) 
 
Table 18: Holding rates of supplementary voluntary pension savings by age in 2000 
Age group  % 
Less than 30  5.8 
30 to 39  15.6 
40 to 49  21.6 
50 to 59  16.4 
60 to 69  6.7 
70 and over  2.1 
Source: Observatoire des retraites (2002) 
   20Table 19: Forecasts of policy insurance reserves and premiums (EUR bn) 
Year  Outstanding of policy 
insurance reserves 
Net flow of policy 
insurance reserves 
Premiums 
2000  647,9 67,1 91,7 
2001  711,1 63,2 84,7 
2002 788,7  77,5  102,3 
2003 869,6  81,0  108,9 
2004 946,4  76,7  107,7 
2005 1  017,0  70,6  104,5 
2006 1  089,1  72,1  108,9 
2007 1  162,3  73,1  112,9 
2008 1  234,5  72,2  114,9 
2009 1  314,5  80,0  125,8 
2010 1  398,8  84,4  133,5 
Average 2000-2010    75,1  110,4 
Source: Boutillier et al. (2001) 
 
 
   21Table 20: The PREFON pension scheme 





(in euros)  Per sem-
ester 
Per 





to 30  
(1,8) 
from 31 
to 35  
(1,6) 
from 36 
to 40  
(1,4) 
from 41 
to 45  
(1,2) 
from 46 






to 60  
(0,9) 
from 61 




O1  185,53   92,77  46,38  15,46  325 P  278 P  247 P  216 P  186 P  170 P  155 P  139 P  124 P  108 P 
03 
(01 X 2)  371,06  185,53  92,77  30,92  649 P  557 P  495 P  433 P  371 P  340 P  309 P  278 P  247 P  216 P 
05 
(01 X 3)  556,59  278,30  139,15  46,38  974 P  835 P  742 P  649 P  557 P  510 P  464 P  417 P  371 P  325 P 
06 
(01 X 4)  742,12  371,06  185,53  61,84  1 299 P  1 113 P  989 P  866 P  742 P  680 P  618 P  557 P  495 P  433 P 
07 
(01 X 5)  927,65  463,83  231,91  77,30  1 623 P  1 391 P  1 237 P  1 082 P 928 P  850 P  773 P  696 P  618 P  541 P 
08 
(01 X 6)  1 113,18   556,59  278,30  92,77  1 948 P  1 670 P  1 484 P  1 299 P 1 113 P  1 020 P 928 P  835 P  742 P  649 P 
09 
(01 X 8)  1 484,24   742,12  371,06  123,69  2 597 P  2 226 P  1 979 P  1 732 P 1 484 P  1 361 P 1 237 P 1 113 P  989 P  866 P 
10 
(01 X 10)  1 855,30   927,65  463,83  154,61  3 247 P  2 783 P  2 474 P  2 165 P 1 855 P  1 701 P 1 546 P 1 391 P  1 237 P 1 082 P 
12 
(01 X 12)  2 226,36   1 113,18  556,59  185,53  3 896 P  3 340 P  2 968 P  2 597 P 2 226 P  2 041 P 1 855 P 1 670 P  1 484 P
 
1 299 P 
 
15 
(01 X 15)  2 782,95   1 391,48  695,74  231,91  4 870 P  4 174 P  3 711 P  3 247 P 2 783 P  2 551 P 2 319 P 2 087 P  1 855 P 1 623 P 
18 
(01 X 18)  3 339,54   1 669,77  834,89  278,30  5 844 P  5 009 P  4 453 P  3 896 P 3 340 P  3 061 P 2 783 P 2 505 P  2 226 P 1 948 P 
Contribution value of the point 2002 = 1,20 euro – Pension value of the point = 0,0840 euro 
annual 
The number of points is calculated according to the following formula :  class the of t coefficien
po the of value
on contributi
n       .
int      
= . Example : for a contributor aged under 26, 
n = 185,53 euro / 1,20 x 2,10 =  325 points. The annual pension is calculated by multiplying the pension value of the point by the number of points.
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Appendix 2: The Thomas Act on pension funds (1997) 
 
 
The Thomas Act has been adopted on the 25
th  March 1997 , but never applied, and formally abrogated 
on the 17
th January 2002. A first section is devoted to the analysis of the Retirement Savings Plans (Plans 
d'épargne retraite), while the second one describes the functioning of the Retirement Savings Funds (Fonds 
d'épargne retraite). 
 
1.  Retirement Savings Plans (Plans d'épargne retraite) 
 
  First of all, there is a group contract (contrat de groupe)  concluded between a firm and a pension fund. 
This contract is called retirement savings plan (Plan d'épargne retraite), and is aimed to provide a pension for 
workers of this firm (and possibly workers of other firms) that freely agree to adhere to this group contract. The 
retirement savings plans sets the contractual agreement on contributions and provisions. Then the law defines the 
retirement savings fund (fonds d'épargne retraite) that collects the contributions, invests the accrued funds and 
serves the pensions to retirees. 
 
• the underwriting of PER 
 
 The  PER is a contract concluded between an employer, or a group of employers, and a financial 
intermediary. The contract can be agreed on a firm or an occupational basis, at a local, regional or national level. 
The agreement may be reached through a collective bargaining including workers' representatives, or may result 
from an unilateral decision if no collective agreement has been reached within a six months' notice. After the 
contract has been signed, it is proposed for adhesion to the concerned workers (wage earners of the firm or of the 
sector) who are free to join the PER or not. 
 
  If an employer has chosen not to subscribe a PER in a one year notice from the promulgation of the law 
(that is to say before March 25 1998), the wage-earners of the firm are allowed to join an existing PER. If the 
firm proposes a PER afterwards, the wage-earners may choose to have their rights transferred to this new plan 
without penalties. 
 
• only wage-earners of private companies can join a PER 
 
  Only wage-earners of private companies, affiliated to old age social security and complementary pay-
as-you-go pension schemes, are eligible to become participants to  a PER. The number of potential members is 
about 13,8 million. This excludes self-employed workers, civil servants workers depending on (numerous) 
special pay-as-you-go pension schemes. 
  
 The  PER may define different homogenous categories of wage-earners (for example, blue collars and 
white collars) and conditions of affiliation accordingly. 
 
• contributions: employers' and employees' sharing, social-security and tax exemptions 
 
  Employers' and employees' contributions are optional. The employer's annual contribution cannot 
exceed four times the employee's contribution. 
 
  As in many countries, the fiscal benefits of the PERs   rest on a EET regime, which means that 
contributions and interest earnings are tax free, while retirement benefits are subject to income taxation. Some 
fiscal incentives have been enacted both for the employees and employers. 
 
  For the employee, the fiscal incentive amounts to an  income reduction: the employee can deduce his 
(her) own contribution as well as the employer's one off his (her) taxable income up to a limit equal to 
Max(5%•Y; 20%•C), where Y denotes the overall gross income of the wage-earner, and C the social security 
ceiling. If the fiscal advantage (that is to say the difference between the upper limit and the contributions) has not 
been fully used in a given year, it can be carried forward in any of the three following years. This fiscal incentive 
differs from what is observed for the individual insurance contracts, where the tax exemption concerns the 
pension benefits received at the end of the contract. 
 
   23  The employers’ pension contributions are not subjected to social-security contributions up to 85% of the 
social security ceiling. 
  
• the defined-contribution plans: annuities or lump-sum benefits; survivor benefits 
 
 The  PERs cannot be defined-benefit plans. 
  
 The  PERs  entitle their participants to perceive an annuity when they definitely terminate their 
employment, and, at the earliest, at the legal retirement age. Since employees cannot perceive their accrued 
rights before this legal age, no vesting provisions have been enacted. This provision clearly introduces a locking-
in aspect in PERs . 
 
  Although the annuity is the rule, some exceptions have been provided for by the law: 
-  at the retirement date, the employees can opt for a lump-sum benefit up to 20% of the accrued liabilities (the 
remaining 80% being annuities), as long as this lump-sum is less than 75% of the Social security ceiling; 
-  if the accrued benefits are less than a limit (set by decree), they are liquidated in a lump-sum payment. 
 
  The affiliated can choose to have his(her) accrued benefits being transferred to the surviving 
widow/widower, or minor, disabled or incapable children, after his(her) death. Although the law is not explicit, it 
should be understand that this possibility is offered when the death occurs after retirement, i.e. in the 
compensation phase of the PER. 
 
• portability of accrued rights 
 
  In case of breach of the labour contract, the affiliated may choose to remain in the initial plan. He(she) 
may  ask for the full transfer of his (her) accrued rights to another PER with no financial penalties. 
 
  When no interruption of the labour contract occurs, the affiliated may ask for the portability of his (her) 
accrued rights to another PER, with a vesting period of 10 years. This option can be exerted only once. 
 
 
2.  The Retirement Savings Funds (Fonds d'épargne retraite) 
 
  The Retirement Savings Fund (FER) is a financial intermediary. As a a legal entity, its sole objective is 
to fulfil the commitments taken within a PER. 
 
• external management 
  
  The list of the financial intermediaries entitled to manage pension funds is restrictive: insurance 
companies (public or mutual) that are under the supervision of the Code des assurances and provident societies 
(institutions de prévoyance) that are under the supervision of the Code de la sécurité sociale. This means that a 
bank cannot enter the pension funds market unless it creates an insurance subsidiary. 
 
  The choice of a denominated FER  can be written down in the PER agreement. In this case, the PER 
includes a clause that specifies the conditions under which the sponsor may choose another FER . When the 
sponsor decides to choose another FER, the assets and provisions of the former FER are transferred to the new 
one at no cost. 
 
 The  FER may operate only after receiving the legal agreement of the relevant Ministry (finance, or 
finance and social affairs). This agreement is delivered under considerations such as technical and financial 
means of the FER, manager's honour and ability, capital adequacy… 
 
 The  FER may delegate the management of its assets to an investment company (entreprise 
d'investissement). 
 
• Portfolio regulation, regulation of funding and ownership of surpluses 
 
 The  FER are subjected to funding, accountancy and ownership of surpluses regulations that will be 
specified in a decree. 
 
   24 The  FER will not be entitled to invest more than 65 % of their assets in bonds and shares of mutual 
funds. In the preliminary debates at the Parliament, it had been suggested to impose a minimum of 35 % 
investment in equities; this rule has been rejected since it overrides the European directives. 
 
  Other portfolio diversification rules have been enacted. First of all, no more than 5 % of the assets of a 
FER can be invested in shares of a given company (or of a given mutual fund). Secondly, a FER cannot invest 
more than 10 % of its assets in non listed shares as a whole, and no more than 0,5 % in shares of a given non 
listed company. 
 
• prudential issues 
 
  The law includes many detailed articles devoted to prudential issues. Only the substantial provisions 
will be mentioned hereafter. As soon as a PER  is adopted, the employer is enforced to implement a supervisory 
board (Comité de surveillance). At least half of this supervisory board consists of employee representatives. The 
supervisory board defines the broad orientations of the PER and the FER  management. The state control is 
exerted by a joint committee made of representatives of the Commission de contrôle des assurances and of the 
supervision committee of social security institutions. This ad hoc committee makes sure that the FERs respect 




  The newly elected French president advocates the implementation of pension funds in France. The 
reform which is on the top of his political agenda could be close to the Thomas Act, since it was proposed under 
the Juppé government. 
   25Appendix 3 
 
List of official books, reports, and contributions on the reform of the French pension system since 1990: 
 
Date        Author(s) Title Ordered  by
1991  Commissariat Général au Plan  Le livre blanc des retraites  Michel Rocard, Prime Minister 
1995  Commissariat Général au Plan  Le “livre noir” (actualisation of the preceding report)  Michel Rocard, Prime Minister 
1998    Conseil  d’Analyse  économique
(Davanne, Lorenzi, Morin, eds) 
Retraites et épargne  Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister 
1999  Jean-Michel Charpin  L’avenir de nos retraites  Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister 
2000  René Teulade  L’avenir des systèmes de retraite  Conseil économique et social 
2002  Conseil d’Orientation des retraites  Retraites: renouveler le contrat social entre les générations  Statutory report to the Prime minister 
2002 Conseil  d’Analyse  économique
(Aglietta, Blanchet, Héran, eds) 
  Démographie et économie  Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister 
 
 
   26